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Local Taxes, Federal Courts, and School Desegregation in ·the
Proposition 13 Era
·

In the twenty-five years since Brown v. Board ef Education, 1
school desegregation has propelled America into its frenetic modem
phase in race relations. 2 With varying success, the federal judiciary
has committed itself to termir1.ating that discrimination which affects
segregated children's "hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone." 3 That commitment to school integration has carried with
it significant social costs, including strong and unbowed community
resistance, 4 inconvenience and hardship for students, substantial
public expenditures, and flight by white residents from the desegregated school district, sometimes resulting in an even more pronounced racial imbalance.5 Indeed, influential social scientists have
questioned whether the benefits of most desegregation methods outweigh these costs.6 Other commentators have suggested that, even
disregarding costs, the achievement of racial balance in the schools is
not the most effective way to improve black children's education.7
Nevertheless, propelled by the Supreme Court's mandate to termil. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Brown I].
2. See Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of
Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7 (1975).
3. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494. But see Hawley & Rist, On the Future Implementation of
School Desegregation: Some Considerations, 39 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 412 (1975).
4. See Comment, Community Resistance lo School Desegregation: Enjoining the Undefinable Class, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (1976); Hain, Techniques of Governmental Reorganization To
Achieve School Desegregation, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 779,808 (1975); Read, supra note 2. For an
extensive study of one community's response to desegregation, see W. RECORD & J. RECORD, ·
LITTLE ROCK, U.S.A. (1960).
5. See Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229,264 (S.D. Ohio), qffd. in part,
583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), qffd., 443 U.S. 449 (1979). The costs of desegregation orders that
include receiverships and similar pervasive management of the school system can grow particularly large. Comment, Equitable Remedies: An Analysis ofJudicial Utilization ofNeoreceiverships to Implement Large Scale Institutional Change, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 1161, 1198.
6. See Fiss, The Jurisprudence of Busing, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 194 (1975). Dr.
James Coleman, whose 1966 study provided a principal motivation for extensive busing, J.
COLEMAN, E. CAMPBELL, C. HOBSON, J. MCPARTLAND, A. MOOD, F. WEINFIELD & R. YORK,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966), has since argued that busing has been
largely counterproductive as it has been handled thus far. See Scholar Eases Criticism ofStudy
of White Flight, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1976, § D, at 14, col. l. But see Rodgers, The Supreme
Court and School Desegregation: Twenty Years Later, 89 POL. Sci. Q. 751, 775-76 (1974);
Symposium on Completing the Job of School Desegregation, 19 How. L.J. l (1975). See generally EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (Harvard Educational Rev. ed. 1969); ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan ed. 1972).
7. See Bickel, Education in a Democracy: The Legal and Practical Problems ofSchool Business, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS 53, 54 (1973). But see United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
380 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
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nate segregated schooling, federal district courts continue their desegregation efforts.
A recent trend in state referenda and legislation promises to
make those efforts even more difficult. Tax limitation provisions whether in the form of constitutional restraints on state or local taxing authority such as California's highly publicized Proposition 13 8
or legislatively imposed ceilings on local taxing authority9 - may
significantly restrict the ability of a state or local government to raise
money. 10 This Note examines a federal court's dilemma when the
remedy of sqhool desegregation collides with the trend of tax limitation - when a school desegregation order requires funds that the
local school authorities do not have and cannot raise. Can the district court order a local tax levy to fund school desegregation when
the school authorities have already reached their maximum taxing
limit? Is there a better alternative remedy?
To tackle those questions, this Note first elucidates three equitable principles to guide courts in fashioning desegregation decrees. It
then explores the history of judicial power to order state and local
governments to levy taxes and finds that power tightly circumscribed. In Section III, the Note offers an alternative to the courtordered tax levy: a decree that directs local school authorities to desegregate, letting them decide whether to fund the desegregation by
raising taxes or by reallocating their present budget. It assesses this
proposal in light of the three equitable principles of desegregation
and concludes that the proposal carries out those principles more
faithfully than a court-ordered tax levy.
I.

PRINCIPLES FOR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION REMEDIES

In Milliken v. Bradley, 11 the Supreme Court summarized its ear-

lier holdings and presented relatively specific guidelines for school
desegregation orders. The opinion, as further defined in more recent
cases, identifies three basic equitable principles to guide the formation of a decree. First, the remedy "must be designed as nearly as
possible 'to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.' " 12
Federal courts have been surprisingly bold in seeking such restoration; the segregation cases departed from a history of judicial reluc8. CAL. CONST. art. )CTIIA.
9. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.§§ 6-1.1-18, -19 (Burns 1978 & Supp. 1979).
IO. Thirteen states passed referenda in the November 1978 election limiting the spending
or taidng power of state and local governments. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1978, § A, at 20, col.
5.
11. 433 U.S. 267 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Milliken II].
12. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Milliken I]).
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tance to grant mandatory injunctions against government officers
and triggered an increasing willingness to issue such decrees. 13 Expanding on the traditional flexibility of equitable remedies, 14 appellate courts have upheld a variety of prohibitions and affirmative
requirements in desegregation orders. 15
The second principle for desegregation remedies, on the other
hand, limits the permissible forms of a remedial decree: "[T]he desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of
the constitutional violation" 16 and must be directly related to the
"condition alleged to offend the Constitution." 17 Hence, the district
court must confine its remedy to eliminating the effects of past governmental discrimination and not attempt the herculean labor of
eradicating the effects of all private segregative behavior. 18 This second principle has prompted the Supreme Court to strike down a dis13. See Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1061-62 (1965). See
also Note, Receivership as a Remedy in Civil Rights Cases, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 115 (1969)
(discussion of equity's development of protection for personal rights).
14. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,300 (1955). [hereinafter cited as Brown II].
See generally H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY§ 23 (2d ed. 1948).
15. Soon after Brown II, federal courts affirmed prohibitions against individuals who directly interfered with desegregation orders, including a governor who ordered out the National
Guard, Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958), and
a private citizen who advocated violent opposition to desegregation, Kasper v. Brittain, 245
F.2d 92 (6th Cir), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957). The courts also asserted equitable control
over school system management. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 287 (1977) (remedial educational programs for black students); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
23-25, 27-31 (1971) (racial quotas for student bodies, noncontiguous attendance districts, busing); United States v. Montgomery Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1969) (faculty and staff
desegregation). See also Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817 (5th
Cir. 1969).
When confronting particularly recalcitrant local school authorities, district courts have appropriately broader power to facilitate desegregation by appointing a receiver over a troublesome school. See Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1042 (1977); Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724, 731-35 (S.D. Ga. 1965) (supplemental opinion 1966). Moreover, in many cases where courts have issued a comprehensive decree and
retained jurisdiction, the district judge has virtually assumed the role of a receiver. See Roberts, The Extent of Federal Judicial Equitable Power: Receivership of South Boston High
Schoof, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55, 74 (1976).
16. Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977). See also Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-94
(1976).
17. Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974). See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. I, 16 (1971).
18. The remedies in southern desegregation cases before Milliken I stressed an affirmative
duty on the part of school officials to desegregate completely, and courts judged each desegregation plan on its success in achieving that goal. See United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd.
of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 489 (1972); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972);
North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1971). Although these cases may appear to
conflict with Milliken Fs controlling principle, at least one commentator has contended that
they may be consistent: where the school authorities had expressly labelled schools as black or
white, complete integration may have been necessary to reverse such stigmatization; accordingly, the courts demanded complete desegregation. Kanner, From Denver to Dayton: The
Development of a Theory of Equal Protection Remedies, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 382 n.l (1977).
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trict court decree ordering a school system to maintain a specified
racial balance in schools after racial discrimination through official
action had been eliminated from the system. 19 It has also led the
Court to reject intersystem busing as a remedy where only one
school system had been liable for constitutional violations. 20
The Supreme Court's third principle of school desegregation
remedies requires lower courts to consider "the interests of state and
local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the
Constitution."21 The district court must therefore choose a remedy
that rectifies the constitutional violation with a minimal intrusion
upon the autonomy of state and local governments. It is this principle that makes a judge pause before ordering a tax levy. The conflict
between a state tax ceiling and the need for expensive remedial ac19. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 31-32 (1971). See also
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976). Professor Tribe quite correctly views the Spangler decision as a retreat from desegregation cases advocating broad equitable powers in the district courts. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-20
(1978).
·
20. In Milliken I, the Court reversed an order requiring desegregation of 54 school districts
in metropolitan Detroit. The district court had found only the Detroit school system to have
treated students unequally but had included the suburban systems in the decree because desegregation in the city alone would have placed only a trivial percentage of white students in each
school, 418 U.S. 717, 735 (1974). Although such a metropolis-wide remedy might have been
appropriate had the suburban segregation been caused by the city system's unconstitutional
acts, see Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 203 (1973), the Supreme Court held that
because the disparate treatment of black and white students occurred only within the Detroit
school system, the remedy had to be limited to that system. 418 U.S. at 744-45. The Court was
not prepared to use school desegregation to reverse the effects of other sources of discrimination. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 757 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 418 U.S. at 762 (White, J.,
dissenting); 418 U.S. at 781 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. I,
413 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
This second equitable principle even led the Court tentatively to extend Milliken I to intrasystem violations. In Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), the Court
required the plaintiffs to demonstrate how much of the segregation in the school system was
caused by unconstitutional behavior, as distinct from that segregation caused by residential
patterns or similar extraneous factors. It then concluded that courts should remedy only those
segregative effects stemming from particular, proven acts of discrimination rather than remedy
all segregation within the district. Thus, the plaintiffs had to prove the marginal effect of the
defendant's unconstitutional behavior; the remedy could correct only such marginal discrimination. Kanner, supra note 18, at 403-05. See also School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 667
(1977); Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977).
Perhaps recognizing the potentially crippling effect of this standard, the Court hedged
somewhat and upheld systemwide remedies without closely examining the extent of the constitutional violation when Dayton reappeared before the Court, Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979), along with a companion case, Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449 (1979). The two decisions may well have rested on what dissenting Justice Rehnquist
termed a "talismanic" reliance on the trial court's use of the words "systemwide violation."
443 U.S. at 491. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). However, any other outcome would either have
greatly increased the scope of appellate review in desegregation cases or have essentially eliminated school desegregation decrees through an insurmountable burden of proof.
21. Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977). This third principle necessarily entails balancing individual and public interests. See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
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tion by a school system epitomizes the tension between principles of
desegregation and federalism.
II.

JUDICIAL POWER To ORDER TAXATION

The Supreme Court first raised the possibility that a federal court
might levy a tax to pay for a remedy in Gr!ffin v. County School
Board. 22 In that case, the school board of Prince Edward County,
Virginia, had devised a complex scheme to avoid Brown's mandate
for desegregated schools. The county closed its public schools in
1951, and the Board of Supervisors did not levy taxes or appropriate
funds for schools from that time until Gr!ffin was decided in 1963.
White parents quickly established all-white private schools, and the
State of Virginia and Prince Edward County jointly paid tuition
grants to those parents. Additionally, the county provided a 25 percent property tax credit for contributions to the white schools. From
1959 to 1963, there were no schools for black children in Prince Edward County. Reversing the Fourth Circuit's disposition of the
case,23 the Supreme Court held that the schools' closing violated the
equal protection clause. 24 A state need not treat all of its counties
alike, but "[w]hatever nonracial grounds might support a State's allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation
do not qualify as constitutional."25
The Court then discussed the appropriate remedy, affirming the
district court decree:
The injunction against paying tuition grants and giving tax credits
while public schools remain closed is appropriate and necessary since
those grants and tax credits have been essential parts of the county's
program . . . to deprive petitioners of the same advantages of a public
school education enjoyed by children in every other part of Virginia.
For the same reasons the District Court may, if necessary to prevent
further racial discrimination, require the Supervisors to exercise the
power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen,
operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a public school
system in Prince Edward County like that operated in other counties in
Virginia. 26
'
22. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
23. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963), revd. sub nom. Griffin v.
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). The district court had ordered the reopening of the
schools, Allen v. School Bd., 207 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Va. 1962), but the Fourth Circuit reversed
without reaching the merits, awaiting determination of Virginia law in the state courts. The
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the entire scheme under state law. County School
Bd. v. Griffin, 204 Va. 650, 133 S.E.2d 565 (1963).
24. 377 U.S. at 231-32.
25. 377 U.S. at 231 (footnote omitted).
26. 377 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Significantly for the purpose of
this Note, Justices Clark and Harlan disagreed with the holding that the federal courts are
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Two aspects of Gr!ffin raise doubts, however, about whether the
Court's strong directive to levy a tax would be repeated in the face of
a tax ceiling limiting funds available for desegregation. First, the
constitutional violation in Gr!ffin stemmed from the school authorities' total failure to provide funds for public schools.27 The issue was
not how big a tax the school board should levy, but whether it should
levy a tax for schools at all. 28 Second, Gr!ffin involved no statutory
or constitutional tax limitation; the Supreme Court suggested a tax
levy fully within the authority of the Board of Supervisors, an authority that the Board had exercised until it began e.fforts to block
desegregation.
This second, potentially limiting feature of Gr!ffin becomes crucial if a school board lacks the power to raise taxes to fund desegregation. Unfortunately, Justice Black's majority opinion in Gr!ffin
gave no guidance in defining the judicial power to levy taxes, since it
cited no authority for the existence of the power at all. However,
Judge J. Spencer Bell, in his dissent to the Fourth Circuit's resolution of Gr!ffin, 29 also endorsed a court-ordered tax levy, and he provided substantial precedent for that equitable remedy: 30
empowered to order the reopening of the public schools, but otherwise joined in the opinion.
Thus, despite the constitutional violation, two Justices felt that some remedies were inappro•
priate due to the state or locality's interest in managing their own schools.
27. In Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969), the
Fifth Circuit recognized this distinction. The Plaquemines Board had systematically at•
tempted to destroy its own school system to benefit white private schools, yet had kept the
public schools operating at a minimum level so as to avoid the Gr!ffin precedent. The court
recalled "no record in any school which ... revealed so graphically official attempts to destroy a public school system and to flout the mandates of the United States Constitution." 415
F.2d at 835 n.29.
The extensive district court decree ordered that the local authorities return the public
schools to their pre-desegregation stature, and that the school board apply for federal aid from
several specified programs. On appeal, the appellees cited Gr!ffin's tax levy directive in support
of the decree, but the Fifth Circuit refused to accept the analogy:
A most appealing argument can be made that if the district court has the power to
require a county board to levy taxes for the operation of schools, it also has the power to
require the School Board to accept proffered financial assistance from federal agencies. . . . But [Gr!ffin] must be considered a unique case. The Prince Edward County
schools were closed and the court directed that they be reopened and that taxes be levied
and collected to operate them. The subjects of levy, tax rates, and collection methods
were left to the commands of state law under state standards. Here the provision (of the
district court order] goes beyond [Gr!ffin], as to source, manner, and controls accompanying the funds . . . . We conclude that approval of the provision as now broadly written is
not justified.
415 F.2d at 833.
The circuit court stated, however, that its reversal was without prejudice to the right of the
district court to order the board to apply for specific funds where it had failed to apply in order
to retard desegregation. 415 F.2d at 833.
28. A rereading of Gr!ffin, when considered within the unique facts of the case, suggests
this interpretation. See text at note 26 supra.
29. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332,344 (4th Cir. 1963) (Bell, J., dissenting),
revd sub nom. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
30. Curiously, Justice Black's opinion failed to refer to Judge Bell's discussion of the tax
levy remedy. Arguably, its failure to mention any precedent suggests agreement with the dis-
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Neither am I impressed with the argument that the district court
has no power to compel a levy of taxes for a monetary appropriation
by the defendant Board of Supervisors should it fail to obey the mandate of the district court. It should be enough to cite Virginia v. West
Virginia.31
Virginia v. West Virginia 32 involved an indebtedness that arose
between the two states at the time of their separation. Congress approved the terms of West Virginia's debt when it admitted the new
state into the Union. Worried that West Virginia might never pay,
Virginia sued its Siamese twin, requesting that the Supreme Court
compel the state to levy a tax to pay the debt. The Court recognized
the debt's validity, but refrained from issuing a tax levy injunction
despite considerable dicta suggesting that such a remedy was within
its power. The Court trusted either that West Virginia would willingly comply once the Court had certified the obligation or that Congress would enforce the debt because it had approved the obligation
originally. If those methods failed, however, the Court appeared
willing to issue an injunction compelling state taxations. As Judge
Bell concluded in his Gr!ffen dissent, the Virginia Court was "plain in
its implication that West Virginia could be compelled to pay if compulsion were the only way to accomplish the result." 33
The Virginia court had in t_um relied heavily upon a series ofnineteenth-century municipal bond cases. 34 There the Supreme
Court had shown little reluctance in ordering tax levies to pay holders of delinquent municipal bonds when the municipality had failed
to exercise its full taxing power.35 However, the Court had recog.:.
sent reaching the same conclusions. On the other hand, the Court may have wished to avoid
any reliance upon Judge Bell's bond cases, see notes 32-40 i,!fra and accompanying text, preferring instead to rely on an amorphous equity powers rationale.
The petitioners' brief in Gr!ffin cited James v. Duckworth, 170 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Va.),
q(fd., 267 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959), as authority for a federal court
to order a tax levy. That case, however, merely affirmed an injunction that prohibited the city
council from withholding school funds that it had previously collected and allocated and then
later withheld so as to avoid desegregation. See note 59 il!fra.
The amicus brief of the United States, however, did point to the bond cases as authority for
a decree that would levy a tax, citing, inter alia, Labette County Commrs. v. United States ex
rel. Moulton, ll2 U.S. 217 (1884); City of Galena v. Amy, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 705 (1866). Brief
for United States at 6.
31. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332, 347 (4th Cir. 1963) (Bell, J., dissenting),
revd. sub nom. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
32. 246 U.S. 565 (1918).
33. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 322 F.2d at 347 (Bell, J., dissenting), revd. sub nom.
Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
34. Judge Bell also cited them in his Griffin dissent, 322 F.2d at 347. Although some of the
bond cases involved bonds issued for capital improvements or judgments against municipalities, the majority of these cases arose from railroad bonds. State statutes had incorporated
railroad companies within each state, authorizing the state's political subdivisions to invest in
the railroad stock and issue bonds in order to pay for the stock. The municipal investment was
necessary to provide sufficient capital for the railroads.
35. E.g., Labette County Commrs. v. United States ex rel. Moulton, 112 U.S. 217 (1884);
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nized two substantial limitations on its authority to order taxation.
First, the local government could only be compelled to levy taxes to
the extent permitted by state law.36 Since the local government was
a creature of state law, that law circumscribed the local government's
taxing authority. 37 "We cannot create new rights or confer new powers. All we can do is to bring existing powers into operation."38 Second, if the local government was already taxing at its statutory
maximum, the Court would not investigate the local budget to identify unnecessary expenditures to be reallocated for payment of the
debt. 39 The determination of proper and necessary expenditures was
within the discretion of municipal authorities, and the Court felt it
had no "right to control that discretion, much less to usurp and supersede it."40
Although distinctions can be drawn between these bond cases
and school desegregation remedies, 41 the reliance on the bond cases
in the Fourth Circuit dissent to Gr!lfin suggests that their limitations
City of Galena v. Amy, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 705 (1866). C.f. Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711
(1883) (eleventh amendment barred suit against state on a bond). The authority to tax under
state law was crucial in these decisions. If a state statute permitted the municipality to increase
taxes, the Court was willing to order such an increase to pay bondholders. Indeed, the Court
encouraged the inclusion of new parties not originally liable for the judgment if they were
necessary to levy the tax, Labette, 112 U.S. at 224, and was even willing to issue mandamus
against a newly formed township that had enveloped the governmental functions of the original bonding authority, Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906).
36. See Yost v. Dallas County, 236 U.S. SO (1915); Clay County v. McAleer, 115 U.S. 616
(1885); Thompson v. Allen County, llS U.S. 550 (1885); United States v. County of Macon, 99
U.S. 582 (1879); City of Memphis v. United States, 97 U.S. 293 (1878); City of Cleveland v.
United States, 111 F. 341 (6th Cir. 1901); Weaver v. City of Ogden City, 111 F. 323 (C.C.D.
Utah 1901).
37. See City of Cleveland v. United States, ll I F. 341, 343 (6th Cir. 1901).
38. United States v. County of Macon, 99 U.S. 582, 591 (1879). Eighty years later, the
Gr!lftn Court faintly echoed the same limitation: "the District Court may . . . require the
Supervisors to exercise the power that is theirs to levy taxes . . . ." Griffin v. County School
Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964) (emphasis added).
39. See Missouri ex rel. Harshman v. Winterbottom, 123, 215 (1887); Clay County v.
McAleer, 115 U.S. 616 (1885); City ofE. St. Louis v. United States ex rel. Zebley, 110 U.S. 321
(1884); City of Cleveland v. United States, ll l F. 341 (6th Cir. 1901).
40. City ofE. St. Louis v. United States ex rel. Zebley, ll0 U.S. 321, 324 (1884).
41. The most obvious distinction between the bond cases and the desegregation cases is
that Virginia v. West Virginia and the later bond cases were actions in contract: no constitutional violation had occurred. Of course, this distinction is tempered somewhat by the constitutional quality that the courts accorded contract rights at the time of these bond cases. See,
e.g., Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 728, 746 (1883) (Field, J., and Harlan, J., dissenting).
Hence, courts at the tum of the century may have used as extensive an equitable remedy in
defense of contract rights as they would have for any personal constitutional right. But even
the courts in the bond cases recognized that the complainant bondholders were worthy of only
limited sympathy:
While there has undoubtedly been great recklessness on the part of the municipal
authorities in the creation of bonded indebtedness, there has not unfrequently [sic] been
gross carelessness on the part of purchasers when investing in such securities. . . . If the
purchaser in this case had examined the statutes under which the county was acting, he
would have seen what might prove to be difficulties in the way of payment.
United States v. County of Macon, 99 U.S. 582, 590 (1879). Clearly there is no comparable
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on the taxation remedy may have continuing vitality. That vitality
could well leave a modem federal court groping for an alternative to
ordering a tax levy.
III.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO ORDERING A TAX LEVY THAT
EXCEEDS A STATUTORY MAXIMUM

A fully remedial alternative to the court-ordered tax levy does
exist: courts may order integration within the existing school budgets, requiring school officials to spend funds for desegregation and
to decrease expenditures for other school programs. By limiting its
order to a simple demand for desegregation, the district court would
leave to state and local authorities the problem of deciding whether
to increase taxes or to reallocate the budget.42 This proposal offers
obvious advantages over a court-imposed tax levy. It keeps district
courts out of the business of raising taxes and administering schools
while it remedies the constitutional violations. It avoids extreme reaction to the less invidious cause of the dilemma (tax limitations do
not inherently frustrate the formation of unitary, nonracial school
systems43). It protects the paramount role of state and local authorities in designing curricula and administering schools. "No single
tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern
and support for public schools and to the quality of the educational
process."44
Even more important, by shifting funds and cutting back other
culpability on the part of segregated schoolchildren. Thus, no matter how highly a court may
value contract rights, an equal protection violation is apt to receive a more aggressive remedy.
A second theme that may distinguish the bond obligation cases from school desegregation
is the Supreme Court's evolving view of the eleventh amendment: ''The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. It was not until Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908), that the Supreme Court established the right of citizens to sue their own state
for an injunction forbidding prospective enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974). In the bond cases before Young, the 19th-century notion of state immunity from suit may have encouraged courts to give co~iderable respect to statutes limiting local taxing authority; a court would be understandably reluctant to
compel a municipality to violate a statute when the court could not enjoin the state from
enforcing it against the municipality. In Yost v. Dallas County, 236 U.S. 50 (1915), however,
Justice Holmes's majority opinion held strictly to the earlier bond precedents that limited taxation for bond payment to the methods and limitations prescribed by state statute, Young
notwithstanding. Thus, evolution of the eleventh amendment has not necessarily eliminated
separate treatment for authorized and unauthorized tax levies.
42. See Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (decree directs sheriff to
finance constitutionally mandated jail improvements from other categories in his approved
budget).
43. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451,479 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
44. Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, at 741-42 (1974). See also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
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programs rather than directly raising taxes, the proposal starkly
presents the true constitutional and economic choice facing local citizens: given that schools must be integrated, for what calibre of education are they willing to pay? The choice is not between segregated
and desegregated schools; it may be between desegregated schools
for half days with low taxes and desegregated schools for full days
with high taxes. 45 But once the federal courts assure a desegregated
system, the proposal leaves the remaining determinations with the
state and school district. If they prefer a higher standard of education than their tax limit permits after desegregation, then their remedy is to raise that limit. And such an allocation of responsibility
seems harmonious with the federal system. Since state and local authorities have unfettered discretion under the federal Constitution to
establish the original quality of public education,46 the same discretion should allow citizens to maintain or select a different standard
433 U.S. 406,420 (1977); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 I U.S. I, 50 (1974);
Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. at 451, 477-79 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
45. Such a severe decrease in classes could cause an even more severe decrease in state aid
for the local school system. This is, however, a burden that the state has imposed on its own
school systems much like a state-imposed tax limitation. If conditions under either type of
restriction become catastrophic, the state electorate can remedy the difficulty if it so desires,
46. Several cases have held that desegregation may not cause a reduction in educational
quality or a discontinuance of any courses, services, or extracurricular activities offered by the
schools before desegregation. See Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d
817,831 (5th Cir. 1969); Bradley v. School Bd., 325 F. Supp. 828,846 (E.D. Va. 1971). But see
Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 946-48 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972). However, such holdings arise where local authorities have actively fostered a private, white school
system by degrading the public schools. See note 27 supra. In such situations, the cutbacks in
public education were part of a scheme to avoid constitutionally required desegregation. They
conflicted with the school board's affirmative duty under the remedial order to create a unitary
school district. Absent such devious motives to impede desegregation, however, a school cutback would probably be found constitutionally permissible.
In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), the city of Jackson, Mississippi, had closed its
swimming pools following a court order that all park facilities be desegregated. The city desegregated its parks, zoo, auditoriums, and golf courses, but closed the pools because, according to the findings of the district court, the city concluded that the pools could not be operated
peaceably and economically on an integrated basis, 403 U.S. at 219. A divided Supreme Court
permitted the closing, holding that it need not examine the possible racial motivations of the
city when the effect of the closing was neutral to both blacks and whites and when permissible
legislative concerns such as preserving the public peace and purse may have been the actual
motive, 403 U.S. at 224-25. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LA w § 16-17
(1978),
.
Later Supreme Court cases state that discriminatory intent is needed to violate equal protection even if the actual effect on the races is not equal. In Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court stated that proof of discriminatory intent is required to show a denial of equal protection. 429 U.S. at 265. Washington v,
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), decided a year before Arlington Heights, reached the same conclusion, stressing that neutrality in a statute's application between black and white citizens
weighed heavily against unconstitutionality. See 426 U.S. at 246-48.
A school cutback to fund desegregation appears constitutional whether the court uses an
intent or an effect standard. Under the effect standard, the cutback will apply equally to black
and white students and certainly be less suspect than the pool closing in Palmer. If, however, a
court requires a finding of discriminatory intent, as in the more recent cases of Washington and
Arlington Heights, a school cutback still withstands constitutional attack since it would be part
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of education following tax limitation and desegregation.47
As appealing as this proposal appears, it can be fully acceptable
only if it satisfies the three equitable principles of Milliken. 48 The
remainder of this Section renews attention to those principles, exploring the tension that tax limitation can create among them. It
seeks to demonstrate that a blunt desegregation order satisfies those
principles and resolves their internal tension in a more appealing
manner than does a court-ordered tax levy.
A.

Tension Among the Equitable Principles

This Note's proposal satisfies the second principle - that the extent of the remedy should be determined by the nature and scope of
the constitutional violation49 - rather easily. Indeed, it seems to be
a better fitting remedy than a court-ordered tax levy. Since segregation typically arises from discriminatory school districting plans and
not from the local government's tax rate, state and local tax structures would appear to be beyond the scope of the constitutional violation.50
More intricate is the question of how the proposal reconciles an
inevitable tension between the first and third principles - between
the commands that victims of discrimination be restored as nearly as
possible "to the position they would have occupied in the absence of
of a desegregative remedy fashioned to meet the school district's taxing limitations rather than
to promote segregation.
This Note's alternative to ordering a tax levy in excess of a state tax ceiling therefore seems
to satisfy equal protection. But is it possible that the cutbacks could be so extensive that they
abridge constitutional rights to education? The Supreme Court has not accepted any theory of
a constitutionally mandated quantum of education. In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), upholding Texas's property-tax system of school funding, the
majority opinion expressed severe doubt that a constitutional right to education exists. The
Court observed that even if some identifiable quantity of education were constitutionally required, it would be limited to "an opportunity to acquire basic minimal skills necessary for the
enjoyment of the rights of speech and offull participation in the political process." 411 U.S. at
36. Thus, unless performed to frustrate the establishment of a nonracial school system, a
school program cutback would be constitutional.
47. Giving the public the opportunity to accept a lesser educational program or to raise the
tax ceiling is also consistent with the cases confronting unconstitutional conditions in prisons
and asylums. Courts generally address such cases from the view that if the state chooses to
operate the institutions, it must maintain them at constitutional standards. See Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v.
Eisenstadt, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Holt
v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
Perhaps public distaste for freeing asylum and prison inmates explains the less activist
approach that courts have taken to ordering jail improvements; the threat of release may provide sufficient motivation for expenditures without judicial decree. See Hamilton v. Love, 328
F. Supp. at 1194; Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 712-13 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
48. See the discussion of these principles in notes 11-21 supra and accompanying text.
49. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977).
50. Of course, if the tax limitation itself were unconstitutional, it would be void on independent grounds.
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such conduct" 51 and that courts consider the interests of state and
local governments in managing their own affairs. 52 The proposal
certainly seems solicitous of local interests; at first glance, one could
hardly accuse it of breaching the third princjple. A decree directing
local authorities to desegregate without stipulating precisely how to
do it respects concerns for federalism far more than a court-ordered
tax levy. But it may require a reallocation of funds that reduces the
quality of education for all students, black and white. Once a school
board has, for example, unconstitutionally constructed schools in a
discriminatory fashion, 53 that misallocation of buildings may make
it more expensive to operate a nonracial system than it would have
been had the discriminatory construction never occurred. Even
without such a misallocation of schools, the costs of transporting students across the city to integrate schools may cause the discontinuance of school orchestras, track teams, or advanced chemistry
classes. The victims of school segregation may not be fully restored
"to the position they would have occupied in the absence of' discrimination.
This conflict between full restoration and federalism is not easily
resolved. Determining where the plaintiffs in a desegregation case
might have been had there been no discrimination involves considerable guesswork. School systems are not static, and a district court
cannot know precisely what a school system would be like had invidious discrimination not been shaping decisions for ten or twenty
years.
It may have been in recognition of this uncertainty that the
Supreme Court originally stressed the broad flexibility of equitable
remedies in .Brown - the "facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs." 54 The public needs at stake where a district
court must reconcile a desegregation order and a tax ceiling include
public concerns for federalism 55 - the balance of power between
51. 433 U.S. at 280 (quoting Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974)).
52. 433 U.S. at 280-81.
53. A common segregative technique in northern cities is to construct smaller schools, tailored to small, racially identifiable neighborhoods. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. l, 413 U.S.
189 (1973). See generally Binion, Racial Discrimination by Alteration or Refusal to Alter School
District Boundaries, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 811 (1977); Orfield, Federal Policy, Local Power, and
Metropolitan Segregation, 89 PoL. Ser. Q. 777, 790 (1974).
54. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
55. The strongest reminder of the vitality of federalism is National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which overturned a federal statute extending minimum wage and
maximum hour requirements to all employees of the states and their political subdivisions,
The Court hinted that the statute offended state sovereignty under the tenth amendment, 426
U.S. at 842-43, and held that it "impermissibly interfer[ed] with the integral governmental
functions of [state and local governments]." 426 U.S. at 851. Because National League of
Cities involved a federal statute under the commerce clause rather than a remedial decree for a
constitutional violation, its reasoning is not directly applicable to the issue of federalism and
remedial taxation. The Court's distaste for federal acts that "overwhelm state fiscal policy,"
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state and national governments. 56 Accordingly, to resolve the conflict between the principle of full restoration and the principle of federalism, one must ask whether, under Milliken, an equitable remedy
for discrimination may fall short of fully compensating the victims in
an effort to maintain the balance of federal-state relations. To pose
the question slightly differently, does federalism require that some
desegregation decrees be less than fully compensatory? This Note
will conclude that it does so require where complete desegregation
can be obtained within state-permitted tax rates, and where additional :funds are necessary only to raise the quality of the curriculum
to meet the trial judge's estimation of what the schools would have
been like absent segregation.
Two themes in modem cases lead to this conclusion: (1) the judicial reluctance to circumvent state statutes if the circumvention is
unnecessary to remedy the constitutional violation, and (2) the willingness of the Supreme Court to permit some individual rights to
suffer in order to preserve the balance of federalism.

B. Judicial Respect for State Law
The first theme manifests itself in the funding section of school
desegregation decrees: The funding order is often a vaguely worded
requirement that the defendants "who have such power . . . request
[,] . . . raise and appropriate all funds requisite for the operation of
the . . . school system in full compliance with the terms" of the specific order,57 Other courts avoid the funding issue by branding it
"premature," using the mere incantation of the Gr!lfin taxation remMaryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,203 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting), however, remains significant. Although scholars have construed National League of Cities in a myriad of ways, see,
e.g., Michelman, States' Rights and Stales' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of
Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights lo Essential Government Services, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1065 (1977), the practical interpretation of the case is that the Court felt Congress had
overstepped an intuitive balance in federal-state relations. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 5-22 (1978). See also w. BENNETT, AMERICAN THEORIES OF FEDERALISM,
210-11 (1964). Such an intuitive limit upon federal involvement in state affairs might well
come into play as a judge assesses a proposed decree levying a tax in excess of a state tax
ceiling. Indeed, the Supreme Court has avoided interfering with rights created by the states on
grounds of federalism and comity. Buford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
56. A tax limitation's embodiment in a state constitution or referendum is not apt to alter
the courts' analysis; the Supreme Court has overturned both types of state laws, pausing only
to comment that their form or popularity has no bearing on their constitutionality. See, e.g.,
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 379-81 (1967); Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S.
713, 727-28 (1964). See also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943).
57. Bradley v. School Bd., 325 F. Supp. 828, 847 (E.D. Va. 1971). See also Brewer v.
School Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1969), affd., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Plaquemines
Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969).
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edy as a threat to the local authorities. 58 Thus, local tax and expenditure laws, unrelated to the constitutional violation, remain
untouched by the decree. 59
The Eighth Circuit has discussed the relationship between state
law and equitable remedies in school desegregation cases, but it has
drawn no express distinction between those state laws that must be
circumvented to remedy the constitutional violation and those that
could be left undisturbed by the decree. In Haney v. County .Board of
Education, 60 an Arkansas statute provided that annexation was the
only permissible way to combine two separate school districts. 61 The
plaintiffs in Haney requested that two districts be united by means of
consolidation, which would have provided greater administrative
equality for the smaller, black district. Instead, the district court proceeded under the statute and annexed the black district to the larger
one. 62 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's decision to abide by the state annexation statute. Although the appellate
court observed that the "remedial power of the federal courts under
the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited by state law" when that
law fails to provide a nonracial school system,63 it nevertheless held
that annexation was as successful in achieving that goal as consolidation. On the other hand, the court did object to the state-mandated
procedure for creating the new school board, which e.ffectively left
all five white members in office for up to four years and gave only
58. E.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042
(1977); Pettaway v. County School Bd., 230 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va. 1964). In Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), the court found that conditions in a state mental
institution violated minimum constitutional standards and observed:
[We] regard as premature any issue as to whether the district court should appoint a
Special Master for the purposes of selling or encumbering state lands to finance these
standards, or should enjoin certain state officials from authorizing expenditures for nonessential state functions, and thereby alter the state budget or by other means order a particular mode of financing the implementation of the stipulated standards.
503 F.2d at 1317.
59. The district court may, however, enjoin the withholding of previously appropriated
funds as a device to elude desegregation. In James v. Duckworth, 170 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Va.),
qjfd., 267 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959), the city council of Norfolk,
Virginia, voted to withdraw previously approved funding for all schools above the sixth grade
to avoid desegregation. The district court enjoined that withholding of funds. In affirming,
the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the city council's earlier allocation of the funds; it was
unnecessary to compel funding for the schools directly since enjoining the later resolution
withholding funds accomplished the same result. James v. Duckworth, 267 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959). This distinction is hardly a satisfying one, but it reflects
concerns for "the interest of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs," Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 289-81 (1977), and a desire to minimize interference in funding procedures.
60. 429 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970).
61. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-4601 to 4614 (1969 Supp.).
62. Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 284 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ark.), revd. in part, 429 F.2d
364 (8th Cir. 1970).
63. 429 F.2d at 368.
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three short-term seats to representatives of the black school district.
The court found that the statute mandating such an allocation violated the equal protection clause and accordingly reversed the district court's approval of the school board representation procedure. 64
Despite the strong assertion of equitable powers in Haney, it is
hardly clear that its reasoning extends to state tax ceilings. Haney
merely overturned a statute compelling appointment of a racially
unbalanced school board. Discriminatory application of such
facially neutral state school provisions is often the taproot of a constitutional violation. 65 Surely the network of school regulations that
led to a constitutional violation cannot command great respect from
a court seeking to remedy that violation. Indeed, to require obedience to all school statutes would straitjacket the federal courts from
successfully remedying discrimination; the only way the court in Haney could give the black district equal representation on the school
board was to circumvent the state-required procedure.
Sidestepping a state limitation upon local taxing authority, however, is another matter. In modern desegregation cases, abuse of taxation powers is rarely the basis for a constitutional violation. A
desire to thwart desegregation is not the inspiration for tax limitation
measures; such ceilings generally apply equally to all expenditures of
local government and are independent of the provisions that authorities use or misuse to discriminate against minority students. Moreover, the tax limitation itself does not compel discrimination; rather,
it merely restricts the options of the district court in designing its
equitable remedy. Few would argue that a court should order a nondiscriminatory state teachers' college to double its admissions because more teachers are needed in a nearby school district
undergoing desegregation. Although such a change might eventually assist the desegregation remedy, the college lies beyond the
scope of the constitutional violation and accordingly should be beyond the reach of the court's equitable powers. 66 Likewise, although
circumvention of the state tax limitation may provide a more elegant
remedial decree, the court's equitable powers should not extend that
far if another remedy would alleviate the constitutional violations
while sparing the state law. 67
64. 429 F.2d at 369. The Eighth Circuit relied principally upon Louisiana v. United States,
380 U.S. 145 (1965), for its statement that state law did not restrict remedies of fourteenth
amendment violations. 429 F.2d at 368. Like Haney, however, the Court in Louisiana found
the state statute itself unconstitutional. Thus, neither case gives a district court clear authority
to ignore state law that, though constitutional in application, forces the equitable decree to
follow one remedial course rather than another.
65. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
66. This argument is nothing more than a restatement of the second equitable principle of
desegregation, discussed in the text at notes 16-20 supra.
67. See note 88 iefra.
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United States v. Missouri68 gave the Eighth Circuit an opportunity to clarify Haney and the relationship between a desegregation
decree and a conflic;ting state law - specifically, a state tax limitation. The district court had ordered a merger of three school districts
as a remedy for state-enforced segregation. 69 It heard evidence and
found that the tax rate necessary to finance the desegregated operation of a unified district would have to be higher than the previous
rates in any of the three districts.70 The Missouri Constitution requires that a two-thirds majority of the local citizens approve a
school district's tax levy. 71 Nevertheless, the district court recognized that such approval was unlikely in the aftermath of a desegregation order72 and simply imposed the higher tax rate without
referendum. 73
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit seemed much less eager to ignore
state taxation law than it had been to interfere with school board
representation law in Haney. After firmly restating its dictum from
Haney that state law did not constrain the equitable remedies of federal courts,74 the circuit court nonetheless proceeded to review the
Missouri law governing tax rates after annexation. 75 Without deciding which rate would apply under state law, the court found a less
offensive method than the district court to resolve the dispute. The
local school board had asked the district court to amend its decree
and lower the tax rate to that of the highest of the three old school
districts.76 The lower court had refused, asserting that the new district should not begin operations with a deficit budget. 77 Stating that
"[m]aximum consideration should be given the views of the state and
68. 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975).
69. United States v. Missouri, 388 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Mo.), modified, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th
Cir. 1975).
70. 388 F. Supp. at 1059. See 515 F.2d at 1371.
71. Mo. CONST. art. 10, § 1l(c).
72. 388 F. Supp. at 1059.
73. 388 F. Supp. at 1060.
74. United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d at 1372.
75. 515 F.2d at 1372 nn.7 & 8. Unfortunately, Missouri law governing tax rates after district annexation was anything but clear. Missouri v. Conley, 485 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. App. 1972),
held that the existing tax rate in each district continued to apply after annexation, but the case
did not deal with an annexation caused by judicial decree. See Mo. STAT. ANN.§ 162.441
(Vernon 1965) (amended 1973). Several earlier opinions of the Missouri Attorney General
had held that the voter-approved levy of the annexing district would apply to the annexed
territory. See OP. Mo. ATTY. GEN. No. 362 (1969). Supporting this view, the state constitution required that uniform taxes be levied throughout the territorial limits of the levying authority. Mo. CONST. art. 10, § 3. Thus, although state precedents conflicted as to which rate
should apply, they clearly indicated that a rate no higher than that of the annexing district
could be levied without voter approval.
76. Also, the State Board of Education had moved to amend the judgment, arguing that
sufficient state and federal funds would be available to maintain the district at a tax rate con•
sistent with Missouri law.
77. 515 F.2d at 1372.
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local officials concerned," the Eighth Circuit remanded that portion
of the district court's decree. 78 It held that the school board's request
should have been granted, thereby establishing the highest original,
voter-approved levy as the rate for the new district. In its conclusion, the court remarked that the maximum tax rate "shall be no
higher than that of the annexing district,"79 clearly echoing the view
of Missouri law expressed in the attorney general's opinions. 80 The
Eighth Circuit thus achieved a result that was arguably consistent
with a state taxation law and escaped the need to reexamine its dictum in Haney or the actual relationship between remedial equity
powers and state tax limitations.
The Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the issue of
which state laws a court may override in formulating a desegregation
decree. But in voter rights and reapportionment cases, 81 the Court
has reversed several remedial decrees that had circumvented more
state law than was necessary to remedy the constitutional violation. 82
In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 83 for example, the Court upheld statewide
redistricting but reversed the district court's elimination of multimember districts that the legislature had distributed through the
state for political ends. 84 And in Sixty-Seventh State Senate v.
Beens, 85 the district court's decree had not only reapportioned, but
also reduced the membership of the state's House of Representatives
78. 515 F.2d at 1373.
79. 515 F.2d at 1373 (emphasis added).
SO. See note 75 supra.
81. The analogy to voter rights and reapportionment cases is appropriate because they
provided the major impetus for.the activism of federal courts in handling civil rights violations
by state and local authorities. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 79. Accord, Dell'Ario, Remedies
far School Desegregation: A Limit on the Equity Power ef the Federal Courts?, 2 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. l 13, 142 (1975).
82. Following the early reapportionment cases (Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)), federal courts used a wide variety of equitable remedies to
correct constitutionally infirm districting or election procedures. See Louisiana v. United
States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (voters completely reregistered); Rader v. Cliburn, 476 F.2d 182
(6th Cir. 1973) (terms of office changed); Montana v. Lee, 384 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1967) (aldermanic districts abolished and all elected at large); Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir.
1967) (election invalidated); Reynolds v. State Election Bd., 233 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Okla.
1964) (all state legislators removed from office); Staff, Federal Invalidation as a Remedy for
Irregularities in State Elections, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1092 (1974).
83. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
84. Similarly, in White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973), the district court chose one of three
alternative redistricting plans because it provided the most compact and least gerrymandered
districts, even though it was not quite as effective at equalizing the population among the
districts as one of the other plans. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court
should have chosen the plan subinitted by the state which, although politically motivated,
allocated voters more equally. It concluded that district courts should defer to state policy
when fashioning relief unless that state policy is subject to constitutional challenge, and the
Court found no such vulnerability in legislative policy designed to preserve the constituencies
of incumbent congressmen. 412 U.S. at 797. See also Ferrell v. Oklahoma ex rel. Hall, 339 F.
Supp. 73 (W.D. Okla.), qffd mem., 406 U.S_. 939 (1972).
85. 406 U.S. 187 (1972).
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by one fourth and the Senate by one half. The Supreme Court
would have had no difficulty with a "court-imposed minor variation
from a State's prescribed figure when that change is shown to be
necessary to meet constitutional requirements," 86 but it found the
unnecessarily drastic change in size a violation of the lower court's
equity powers. 87
Thus, the reapportionment cases recognize a distinction between
those state laws that must be circumvented to effect a remedial decree and those that need not. Although the Eighth Circuit did not
expressly adopt such a distinction for desegregation cases, the result
in United States v. Missouri suggests that similar reasoning may have
been at work.
C.

Judicial .Deference to Federalism

The second theme supporting this Note's conclusion is the occasional willingness of the Supreme Court to sacrifice individual rights
for federalism values. 88 The school desegregation cases themselves
demonstrate such a trade-off. In the seminal case assessing a school
desegregation remedy, .Brown II, 89 the Supreme Court exhibited restraint in its equitable directives that can only be attributed to federalism concerns. Rather than ordering immediate dismantling of the
segregated school systems, which would have instantly remedied the
constitutional harm, the Court directed that the dual systems be dismantled "with all deliberate speed." 90 This infamous phrase was a
product of judicial restraint; previous desegregation cases had established the Court's power to require immediate relie£ 91 Moreover,
the Court not only delayed complete implementation, it also rather
surprisingly entrusted primary responsibility for desegregating
schools to the local school boards, the very parties found liable for
intentional discrimination. 92
86. 406 U.S. at 199.
87. 406 U.S. at 20.
88. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 20i (1973) ("federalism requires that federal injunctions . . . be shaped with concern and care for the responsibilities of . . . state
governments"). See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189, 239 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 15-16 (1971).
89. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
90. 349 U.S. at 301.
91. Immediate rectification of unconstitutional discrimination had been the consistent
practice before Brown II. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)
(blacks granted access to all university facilities); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (admission to all-white law school); Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (same); Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (same). Following Brown II, the Court continued to issue orders
for immediate desegregation of noneducational facilities. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S.
333 (1968) (prison facilities); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1958) (buses); New Orleans City
Park Impvt. Assn., 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf
courses).
92. 349 U.S. at 299.
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The Supreme Court's deference to principles of federalism has
extended beyond school desegregation cases. In Reynolds v. Sims, 93
for example, the Court recognized certain legitimate state interests in
reapportionment. It held that reapportioned legislative districts may
deviate from perfect population equality if the lines follow boundaries of an existing political subdivision. Since the state accords these
subdivisions independent political authority, it may also grant them
independent legislative representation.94 The Court directed district
courts, in formulating remedies, to consider the imminency of a new
election, the complexity of state election processes, and whether the
remedy might impose "embarrassing demands" upon a state. 95 The
influence of federalism upon the Court's decision in Sims is evident
when one compares those state reapportionment principles to the
Court's treatment of federal congressional districts. Absolute representational equality is the standard for congressional apportionment.96 For state legislative districts, however, the Court has
allowed population deviations of 16 percent, where the variance preserves the integrity of local political boundaries. 97 The Court thus
sacrifices representational equality - and individual rights of representation - out of respect for the states' internal government.
Judicial abstention, typified by Younger v. Harris, 98 is another
Supreme Court doctrine that sacrifices vindication of individual
rights for the sake of federalism. Under that doctrine, a defendant in
a state criminal trial, as well as in some civil trials where the state is
the plaintiff,99 cannot obtain a federal court injunction to halt the
state proceeding on grounds of state violation of federal constitutional rights. Absent a significant threat of irreparable injury, the
defendant must pursue any federal rights through state appellate
channels, ultimately appealing to the Supreme Court if necessary. 100
The "vital consideration" supporting this doctrine is federalism:
"the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate
and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to
do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the State." 101 Thus, if the state trial court misunderstands the
federal rights involved, a defendant may have to endure a criminal
prosecution under a statute that is unconstitutional on its face 102 or
93. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
94. 377 U.S. at 580-81.
95. 377 U.S. at 585.
96. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
97. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, modified, 411 U.S. 922 (1973).
98. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
99. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
100. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971).
101. 401 U.S. at 44.
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supported py an unconstitutional search. 103 Respect for state institutions rests as the cornerstone of this doctrine restricting the protection of civil rights. 104
Surely the power of a state's citizens to establish a maximum taxing authority deserves as much respect by a federal court as does the
design of a state's political boundaries or the operation of a state's
trials. The ultimate inquiry is whether the costs of federal rejection
of a state taxation limit outweigh the costs of a decree's failure to
place the victims of discrimination precisely where the court guesses
they would have been absent the discrimination. 105 The cases in
which the Supreme Court has considered the effect of federalism
upon remedial decrees suggest that the scales tip against a district
court decree that would unnecessarily override a state tax limitation.106
CONCLUSION

The resolution this Note proposes for the clash between desegregation and tax limitation is an ugly one. But when a school district is
without funds, without authority to raise taxes, and under an expensive affirmative duty to desegregate, there are no pretty options. 107
This Note's proposal - to order school authorities to cut programs
as necessary to fund desegregation rather than impose a state-prohibited tax - recognizes a school district's constitutional duty to
remedy discrimination as well as the right of state and local govern102. See 401 U.S. at 54.
103. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971). One of the few exceptions to Younger
abstention in criminal trials is bad faith harassment by state officials. See Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). q. Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977) (repeated prosecutions and threatened future prosecutions under unconstitutional statute warrant wholly prospective injunctive relief).
104. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,
334-36 (1977).
105. Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189, 240 n.19 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
part) (quoting Comment, School Desegregation After Swann: A Theory of Government Responsibility, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 422 (1972)); Fiss, supra note 6, at 195-96.
106. One case that might suggest a different conclusion, Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284
(1976), did not involve a direct collision of federal and state governmental entities. Although
the Court upheld the plaintiffs' request for an order spanning local political boundaries, no
political unit of the state of Illinois was a party in Hills; the order was directed solely to the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. 425 U.S. at 296. The Court noted that the
Chicago Housing Authority, the agency the federal funds were to flow through, had power
under state law to operate beyond city limits. 425 U.S. at 298 n.14.
107. Commentators have offered other awkward answers to this difficulty, ones more disquieting from a sociological standpoint. Perhaps the directives of Brown v. Board ofEducation
cannot and should not be expected to solve all aspects of the problems of segregated education.
See Read, supra note 2, at 48-49. The answers, however, may require altered assumptions
about local control of education and federalism that will come not from the courts, but from
the political process. See Orfield, supra note 53, at 802. For a thoughtful judicial appraisal of
this central issue, see Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick,
443 U.S. 449, 479 (1979).
·
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ments to establish tax levies and school budgets. Were a district
court to levy a tax in excess of a locality's authority, the order would
rest on precedent of questionable applicability, interfere with the
federal system in a manner unnecessary to fulfill the mandate of
equal protection, and confiscate the responsibility of determining educational standards that has rationally and constitutionally rested
with local citizens.

